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If people who hold anti-fat attitudes believe these attitudes to be true, then anti-prejudice
appeals are likely to be unsuccessful, if only because the targets will not see their atti-
tudes as in need of change. The current study examined processes that may lead people
to see their anti-fat attitudes as ‘truth’ or as ‘prejudice’.
Subjects/Methods
Participants (N = 482) read anti-fat statements and were then presented with an interpre-
tation of these statements as ‘truth’ or ‘prejudice’. The source of this interpretation was
either an (i) in-group or out-group member and (ii) expert or non-expert. Participants’
judgements of the statements were expected to vary such that in-group others and
experts would exert more influence than would out-group others and non-experts.
Results
Participants aligned their own interpretations of an anti-fat statement with those of an
expert, but not with those of a non-expert, F(1,466) = 8.97, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.02. The group
membership variable had no effect on judgements of ‘truth’ or ‘prejudice’ of the anti-fat
statement.
Conclusion
The expressions that people believe constitute anti-fat prejudice versus truth about
people described as overweight are influenced by exposure to expert opinion (in this
case, by medical doctors). Implications for the success of weight-based anti-prejudice
appeals and for healthcare provision are discussed.
Keywords: Expertise, prejudice, social inﬂuence, weight stigma.
Introduction
Up to 40% of American adults have experienced anti-fat
stigma personally (1). Anti-fat stigma, or negative atti-
tudes about people who are in the overweight or obese
weight range (2), is present across many areas of life
(e.g. workplace, school, family, social settings, and health
care) (3), with various negative social, psychological, and
economic consequences. Negative social outcomes in-
clude bullying and victimization (4); negative psychologi-
cal outcomes include body image disturbances (5) and
increased risk of depression (e.g. (4)); and negative
economic outcomes include decreased likelihood of
college attendance (6) and enhanced likelihood of being
overlooked for employment promotions (e.g. (7)).
Furthermore, internalization of anti-fat attitudes (self-
stigmatization) has links to poorer self-reported physical
functioning and poorer self-reported mental health (5).
The widespread prevalence of weight-based stigma
has led to claims that anti-fat sentiment is often seen by
people as an acceptable prejudice to both hold and
express (3). Proposals for more effective public anti-
prejudice appeals are now becoming common in the
domain of anti-fat attitudes (8). Yet a recent systematic
review has suggested that many existing weight-based
anti-prejudice interventions have little evidence of
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effectiveness at reducing pervasive negative beliefs
about overweight and obesity (9).
One reason why existing anti-prejudice appeals fail to
reduce anti-fat beliefs may be because little is currently
known about what people actually perceive to constitute
‘prejudice’. Also unknown are the mechanisms by which
people perceive specific attitudes and behaviours to be
prejudice (and ‘not’ prejudice) and how these perceptions
may be changed. Without this knowledge, the efficacy of
weight-based anti-prejudice appeals will remain unclear,
primarily because people may see anti-prejudice appeals
as irrelevant to their own attitudes and behaviours (which
they may well see as grounded in truth). To create rele-
vant appeals against anti-fat prejudice, people’s percep-
tions of what constitutes ‘prejudice’ and knowledge
about how to influence these perceptions need first to
be gained. The current study seeks to examine this gap
in the literature.
Anti-fat attitudes are common partly because of
entrenched beliefs that people in the overweight range
are to blame for their weight (e.g. (10)). Put simply, people
with overweight and obesity are stereotyped as ‘lazy’ and
‘lacking in self-discipline’ (11), leading to their disparage-
ment (12). Yet the simplistic characterization of
overweight as caused by readily controllable factors does
not adequately represent existing scientific findings about
the uncontrollable determinants of overweight (10,
p. 884), including an obesogenic environment (13), certain
medications (14), genetics and metabolic factors (10),
psychiatric conditions (e.g. binge-eating disorder; (15)),
medical conditions (e.g. chronic fatigue; (16)) and per-
ceived weight-based stigmatization (17,18).
Nevertheless, research on attitude framing has found
that many people who hold anti-fat attitudes do so be-
cause of their belief in the truthfulness of claims that
weight is readily controllable, which they see as a matter
of fact (e.g. (19)). In this way, people justify their anti-fat
attitudes on the grounds that people who are overweight
or obese are at fault and blameworthy (20). That these (in-
correct) beliefs have become a cultural dogma highlights
the need to know more about what people do, and do
not, perceive to constitute anti-fat ‘prejudice’. It highlights
the possibility that people may not perceive negative atti-
tudes about overweight to be prejudice but, instead, to be
something else, such as ‘truth’.
There are claims in the literature to support the assertion
that people may perceive expressions of prejudice as mu-
tually exclusive fromwhat they view as ‘truth’. For example,
when people perceive their attitudes to be factual, they use
claims of ‘truth’ as a protection against accusations of
‘prejudice’ (21). Moreover, if people perceive stereotypes
to contain a ‘kernel of truth’, they may be less likely to be-
lieve that the stereotype is a form of ‘prejudice’ (22).
This raises a question about the factors that might af-
fect perceptions of whether anti-fat attitudes are ‘preju-
dice’ or not. Persuasion research suggests perceptions
may be affected by direct and indirect social influence
from others. Whilst there are some findings to suggest
that social influence is operative in the domain of weight
and stigma (23), social influence has not been widely
studied with regard to people’s perceptions of whether
specific anti-fat statements constitute ‘prejudice’ or
‘truth’. The current study examines two features of the
source of influence that have received considerable
attention in other attitudinal domains: shared group
membership and expertise.
People are persuaded by others whom they perceive to
be similar to them (i.e. in-group members, (24,25)). For
example, facial mimicry of others’ negative emotions has
been shown to occur as a function of in-group-based
social influence (26). In the domain of attitudes, people’s
understandings of language (27) and aesthetics (28) are
influenced more by in-group than out-group members.
Even with regard to food intake, people’s own eating is
influenced by in-group members but not out-group
members (29). Overall, a meta-analysis has indicated that
the persuasiveness of a source will be significantly lower
when that source is perceived as an out-group member
than an in-group member (30).
Speaking specifically to the literature on prejudice,
people’s expressions of prejudice have been found to
correlate strongly with levels of in-group acceptance of
that expression (31). In the current context then, whether
people will be influenced to perceive an anti-fat statement
to be an example of ‘prejudice’ or ‘truth’, based on
whether an in-group member has appraised it as such,
is of interest.
Shared group membership is not the only mechanism
involved in social influence; the expertise of a person
who makes an influence attempt is also an important con-
tributor. Persuasion via expertise involves people’s as-
sumptions about knowledge and accuracy (32), so that
education level and formal rank are factors that lead peo-
ple to form expectations of another’s expertise (33).
Messages delivered by experts are significantly more
influential on people’s attitudes than messages delivered
by non-experts (34). People assume that experts are
credible sources (35) and that experts possess knowl-
edge (36). If an expert’s knowledge is relevant to a topic
of discussion, then it becomes particularly persuasive
(37). What is less clear is the role that experts and medical
doctors in particular play in shaping people’s perceptions
of what constitutes anti-fat ‘prejudice’ versus ‘truth’.
The current study aims to learn more about how and
when people will perceive specific claims to constitute
weight-based prejudice. The current study does not
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examine people’s expressions of prejudice, per se, but
rather people’s views on what is, or is not, an anti-fat atti-
tude, and the circumstances in which these views may be
influenced by others. Review of literature in this field sug-
gests that there are no extant studies on the perceived
acceptability of anti-fat statements that are seen as ‘true’,
in contrast to anti-fat statements that are seen as
‘prejudice’.
Three hypotheses are proposed. It is first hypothesized
that participants will perceive ‘prejudice’ and ‘truth’ as in-
versely related; the more a statement is seen as truth, the
less it will be seen as prejudice (H1). In terms of social in-
fluence, it is hypothesized that shared group membership
with an influencing agent will result in higher persuasion
compared with when no shared group membership is
present (H2). Lastly, it is hypothesized that the views of
an influencing agent with relevant expertise will be more
persuasive than those same views held by an influence
agent without relevant expertise (H3).
Methods
Participants
Participants were assigned to one condition of a 2
(influence attempt of an anti-fat statement:
‘truth’/‘prejudice’) × 2 (influencing agent’s group member-
ship: in-group/out-group) × 2 (influencing agent’s exper-
tise: expert/non-expert) between-participants factorial
design. Participants were recruited through an online ad-
vertisement placed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk plat-
form. The advertisement informed prospective
participants that the study was interested in ‘people’s
opinions about themselves and others’. Participants were
eligible if they were over 18 years old, spoke English as a
first language and had an account registered to a residen-
tial address in the USA.
The mean study completion time was 10 min
(SD = 4 minutes). Any participant who failed more than
one manipulation check (described below; n = 20); who
failed more than one of four items adapted from the
Conscientious Responder Scale (n = 37; (38) or who com-
pleted the study in fewer than 3.99 minutes (suggesting
that they did not properly engage with the study; n = 14)
was excluded. These exclusionary criteria were deter-
mined in advance of performing data analysis. Notwith-
standing, subsequent analyses revealed that the pattern
of significant results was unaffected by inclusion of the
data that were excluded from the primary analysis.
The final sample was 482 people (female = 229;
male = 249; other = 3; prefer not to say = 1). The mean
age was 38.59 years (SD = 12.25). Modal education was
tertiary (n = 359), then secondary (n = 113), vocational
(n = 9) and no formal education (n = 1). The ethnic back-
ground of participants was predominantly Caucasian
(non-Hispanic) (n = 383) but also included Black or African
American (n = 43), Asian (n = 21), Latino or Hispanic
(n = 20), Other (n = 5), Middle Eastern (n = 4), American In-
dian or Alaska Native (n = 3) and Indian or South-Asian
(n = 3).
Materials and procedure
Participants were asked to read a fictitious (although os-
tensibly genuine) newspaper article that made the follow-
ing negative statements about people described as
overweight: ‘most people are overweight because they
have a tendency to eat junk food’; ‘fat people lack self-
control, which is why they eat unhealthy food’ and ‘lack
of physical exercise… is typical of overweight people be-
cause of the exertion involved’.
Experimental manipulations
Participants were then randomly presented with one of
eight possible influence attempts (reflecting all possible
combinations of the three independent variables) made
by an influencing agent who had apparently read the arti-
cle before them. The influence attempt was made either
by ‘Chris Smith’ from the USA (in-group) or ‘Pehel Chat-
terjee’ from India (out-group). The influencing agent was
described either as a ‘medical doctor’ (high expertise in
the context of being overweight and health) or a ‘Walmart
employee’ (low expertise in the context of being over-
weight and health). The influencing agent provided an
opinion about the newspaper article, which was either
that the article constituted ‘prejudice’ or constituted
‘truth’. For example, the ‘prejudice’ influence attempt
was, ‘The fact of the matter is, the article contains
prejudiced statements. In my opinion, it is prejudiced to
say that overweight people eat too much and exercise
too little’.
Dependent variables
To understand what expressions people may perceive to
constitute anti-fat prejudice, participants were asked to
rate the degree to which 18 words (presented in random
order) described the negative weight-based passages in
the newspaper article. Ten of the items had theoretical
links to the concept of prejudice, whilst eight had links
to the concept of truth (Table 1). Responses were mea-
sured on a visual-analogue scale anchored by 0% (no
agreement that the word described the passage) to
100% (the word completely described the passage).
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Manipulation checks
Manipulation checks were included for the independent
variables. For the influence attempt variable, participants
were asked, ‘What was the other person’s opinion about
the newspaper article?’ Response options were ‘The
other person said the article was the truth’ or ‘The other
person said the article was prejudice’. Fifteen participants
were excluded on the basis of failing to correctly answer
this manipulation check.
For the source group membership variable, partici-
pants were asked, ‘From the two names below, whom
do you feel you would identify more with?’ Response op-
tions were ‘Chris Smith’ or ‘Pehel Chatterjee’. Fifty-four
participants reported higher identification with the name
‘Pehel Chatterjee’ than the name ‘Chris Smith’. The main
analyses were run with and without the 54 participants
who reported higher identification with the name ‘Pehel
Chatterjee’ than the name ‘Chris Smith’. This analysis
had little effect on the source group membership variable.
Thus, the participants were retained to minimize attrition
to sample size. Participants were also asked to respond
to a single-item measure of social identity (39): ‘I identify
as an American’. Response options were ‘Fully Disagree’
(1) to ‘Fully Agree’ (7). Average agreement with American
social identification was high (M = 6.41, SD = 1.27).
For the source expertise variable, participants were
asked, ‘What was the occupation of the other person?’
Response options were ‘Medical doctor’ or ‘Walmart em-
ployee’ or ‘I don’t remember’. Five participants were
excluded on the basis of failing to correctly answer this
manipulation check. Participants were also asked ‘From
the two occupations below, which do you feel involves
more expertise?’ Response options were ‘Medical doctor’
or ‘Walmart employee’. Four-hundred and seventy partic-
ipants reported feeling that a medical doctor involves
more occupational expertise than does a Walmart em-
ployee. Participants were then asked, ‘Are you a medical
doctor?’ (n = 5) and ‘Are you a Walmart employee?’
(n = 1). The main analyses were run with and without the
12 participants who reported believing that a Walmart
employee involves more occupational expertise than
does a medical doctor; with and without the five partici-
pants who reported being a medical doctor and with
and without the one participant who reported being a
Walmart employee. These analyses had no effect on the
overall pattern of significant results. Thus, the participants
were retained.
Exploratory variables
The Body Shape Questionnaire 8C (BSQ-8C; (40)) was
then included as a control variable to capture other
factors that may be related to people’s attitudes towards
being overweight. The BSQ-8C is an eight-item measure
that asks questions about participant body image con-
cerns over the last 4 weeks, with response options from
‘Never’ (1) to ‘Always’ (6). A higher score is an indication
of higher concern about one’s body shape. Item exam-
ples are, ‘Have you been afraid that you might become
fat (or fatter)?’ and ‘Have you thought you that you are in
the shape you are because you lack self-control?’ The
BSQ-8C has high internal consistency (α = 0.91; (40))
which was reflected in the current sample (α = 0.92).
Four items based on the Conscientious Responder
Scale (38) were placed throughout the study to check
for whether participants were paying attention to the task.
Item examples are, ‘Please select “Often”’ and ‘Please
slide this scale completely to 100%’. Finally, participants
were asked to provide demographic information about
their age, zip code, level of education, sex, if English
was their first language, and ethnic background.
Results
Dependent variable formation
A high Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling ade-
quacy (0.97) and statistically significant Bartlett’s test of
sphericity (χ2 = 9,173.24, p < 0.001) indicated that an ex-
ploratory principal component analysis (PCA) was an ap-
propriate dimension reduction technique for the 18
dependent variable items. A PCA with varimax rotation




















*Items with theoretical links to the concept of prejudice.
+Items with theoretical links to the concept of truth.
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revealed two eigenvalues over 1 (12.08 and 1.24). Inspec-
tion of a scree plot suggested a one-component solution,
the appropriateness of which was confirmed by a parallel
analysis. A forced one-component solution accounted for
a total of 67.13% of the variance.
The PCA results were used to inform the creation of a
composite dependent variable. The component matrix
for the final one-component solution suggested some
items had strong negative loadings, whilst others had
strong positive loadings. The original item loadings are
shown in Table 1. The correlation between the average
of the positive-loading items and the average of the
negative-loading items was strong (0.823). To account
for items with strong negative loadings, the eight
negative-loading items were reverse-scored. The mean
of all items was calculated to form a highly internally con-
sistent outcome variable: ‘Prejudice/Not Truth Rating’
(PNTR) with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.97.
Analysis of covariance
To test the hypotheses, an Influence Attempt (‘Truth’,
‘Prejudice’) × Influencing Agent Group Membership (In-
group, Out-group) × Influencing Agent Expertise (High,
Low) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on PNTR was con-
ducted with scores on the BSQ-8C entered as a continu-
ous predictor. The full model was statistically significant,
F(15,466) = 2.99, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.09.
In this analysis, the BSQ-8C was statistically signifi-
cant, F(1,466) = 8.00, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.02, ß = 0.13,
reflecting a positive relationship between participants’
concerns about their own body in the 4 weeks before
completing the study and scores on PNTR. There were
no statistically significant interactions with the BSQ-8C.
A significant main effect for Influence Attempt,
F(1,466) = 17.65, p < .05, ηp
2 = .04, was found. PNTR
was higher if the article had first been appraised as
‘prejudice’ (M = 47.12, SE = 1.59, 95% confidence
interval (95% CI) = [44.02,50.27]) than if it had first been
appraised as ‘truth’ (M = 37.74, SE = 1.59, 95%
CI = [34.63, 40.86].
A significant interaction effect between the Influence
Attempt and Influencing Agent Expertise was also found,
F(1,466) = 8.97, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.02. As can be seen in
Figure 1, participants judged the statement to be more
prejudiced (M = 49.73, SE = 2.25, 95% CI = [45.31,
54.15]) when the expert described it as prejudice and
more truthful (M = 33.34, SE = 2.22, 95% CI = [28.97,
37.71]) when the expert described it as truth. In contrast,
in response to a non-expert’s opinion, participants’ judge-
ments of prejudice (M = 44.57, SE = 2.25, 95%CI = [40.15,
48.99]) and truth (M = 42.15, SE = 2.26, 95% CI = [37.71,
46.59]) did not vary. These data were consistent with H3.
No other effects were statistically significant, including
the two-way interaction between the group membership
of the influencing agent and the agent’s interpretation,
F(1,466) = 0.33, p > 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.00, providing no support
for H2 (Min-group/‘prejudice’ = 49.16, SE = 2.25, 95%
CI = [44.74,53.58]; Min-group/‘truth’ = 38.42, SE = 2.26,
95% CI = [34.00,42.86]); Mout-group/‘prejudice’ = 45.54,
SE = 2.25, 95%CI = [41.12,49.96];Mout-group/‘truth’ = 37.38,
SE = 2.24, 95% CI = [33.00,41.78]).
Discussion
In this paper, processes underlying people’s perceptions
of what constitutes ‘prejudice’ were examined, including
how these perceptions may be affected by others. It
was expected that perceptions of prejudice would be in-
versely related to perceptions of truth and that judge-
ments of the prejudiced nature or truthfulness of a
statement would be subject to known social influence
processes. Towards this end, the effects of three inde-
pendent variables on people’s judgements of the ‘preju-
dice’ or ‘truth’ of anti-fat statements were examined: the
nature of an influence attempt, the group membership of
an influencing agent and the expertise of an influencing
agent.
In this study, the finding of a highly internally consistent
one-component PCA solution supported the claim that
the concepts of ‘prejudice’ and ‘truth’ would be perceived
as being inversely related to each other. When appraising
negative weight-based attitudes, participants perceived
‘prejudice’ and ‘not truth’ to indicate a very similar, if not
the same, single construct. This aligns with existing evi-
dence and accords with arguments presented earlier
about the perceived ‘kernel of truth’ at the core of many
stereotypes (22). The results suggest that people do not
believe that ‘true’ expressions constitute anti-fat
Figure 1 Statistically significant interaction between influence at-
tempt and expertise.
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‘prejudice’; this, of course, has practical implications
for anti-prejudice appeals, as discussed in the
succeeding text.
The findings also provide evidence of the social
influence mechanisms that may impact upon people’s
prejudice perceptions. The main effect for the nature of
an influence attempt reflected participants’ judgements
of an anti-fat statement as more prejudiced when it was
first appraised as ‘prejudice’ than when it was first
appraised as ‘truth’. This main effect, however, was
qualified by a significant interaction between the influence
attempt and the relevant expertise of the influencing
agent. Consistent with predictions, participants’
judgements were influenced by an expert but not by a
non-expert. An anti-fat statement was perceived as more
prejudiced when an expert had first appraised the
statement to be ‘prejudice’ than when an expert had first
appraised the statement to be ‘true’. This effect was not
present when either type of appraisal was made by a
non-expert.
Inconsistent with predictions, however, the content of
the social influence appraisal was not qualified by the
group membership of the influencing agent. In many
ways, this is a surprising effect, as a considerable amount
of previous research demonstrates the predicted group-
based influence processes (e.g. (24,25)). There are, how-
ever, several possible explanations for the absence of this
predicted effect. On the one hand, it may simply be that
the group membership of the influencing agent is not an
important factor in people’s determination of whether
potentially negative statements – in this case, anti-fat
statements – are prejudice or truth. No other published
research has demonstrated this effect, so the current
work may identify a scope condition of this group-based
process. However, before rejecting this process, at least
two additional factors should be considered. First, the na-
tionality of the influencing agent may simply be irrelevant
to people’s weight-based judgements. Just as the
current study manipulated relevant expertise in order to
test the expertise-based influence hypothesis, relevant
groups (e.g. weight-based groups) may now need consid-
eration. Second, there is mounting evidence to suggest
that judgements of ‘expertise’ are, in fact, interdependent
with perceptions of shared group membership and in-
group prototypicality (e.g. (41)), so that a medical doctor
may well have been perceived to be more in-group
representative than a Walmart employee among our
participants. In this way, shared group membership may
simply act as a proxy for expertise. All of these possibili-
ties point to the value of re-examination of this hypothesis
in the future work, including pilot testing to determine
relevant and meaningful group memberships for this
specific context.
Finally, when interpreting findings of the current study,
it is important to note that prejudice ratings were currently
relatively low across all conditions. The overall mean for
all eight experimental conditions was 42.44 (SE = 1.12,
95% CI = [40.24, 44.65]), below the scale midpoint. The
implication of this result is that, currently, people did not
perceive negative statements about overweight people
to constitute a high degree of prejudice. This accords with
the findings that, in today’s culture, people see anti-fat
statements as acceptable (3,42). This exemplifies claims
that the efficacy of weight-based anti-prejudice appeals
must be improved.
In combination with existing knowledge that people’s
attitudes guide their subsequent behaviours (43), the
results of the current study highlight how people will not
necessarily see their attitudes towards overweight people
as prejudiced unless they are first convinced that their
attitudes are untrue. Given the low efficacy of historical
weight-based prejudice-reduction attempts (9), targeting
people’s perceptions about the truthfulness of negative
weight biases is now the fundamental challenge for future
anti-prejudice appeals to address.
The current data imply that a way to reduce more
successfully the prevalence of weight-based stigma is
for relevant experts, like healthcare professionals, to
highlight the true (versus untrue) aspects of people’s
beliefs about the controllability of weight. At the same
time, if perceptions of expertise and shared group
membership are, in fact, interdependent (41), there may
also be other potential unexpected consequences of our
proposed strategy. For example, healthcare professionals
who make claims that anti-fat beliefs are untruthful may
simply be seen to be preaching or talking down to their
audience. If so, the doctors may well be recategorized
by their audience as being less in-group prototypical or
even as, say, ‘elite’ out-group members. If so, the
audience would remain uninfluenced (24–30). It is
possible, then, that only those healthcare professionals
who are perceived to possess high relative in-group
prototypicality (in the form of high expertise) in the first
instance can make persuasive appeals against anti-fat
prejudice.
Regardless, on the basis of the current findings, it
would be of interest for future anti-prejudice appeals to
emphasize existing empirical research on the uncontrolla-
ble causes of overweight. This is because people who
believe that weight is highly controllable also hold
significantly greater negative beliefs about overweight
(19). By highlighting uncontrollable factors linked to
weight, it is hoped that people’s perceptions about the
‘truth’ (i.e. facts) about the causes of overweight will
change. Here, it is suggested that one way to success-
fully influence people’s perceptions about the causes of
Obesity Science & Practice Prejudice and social influence G. C. Lee et al. 33
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overweight in such a way is by delivering anti-prejudice
messages via healthcare experts, like medical doctors.
Whilst the results of this study contribute to under-
standings about when people will perceive anti-fat atti-
tudes to constitute ‘prejudice’, this investigation also has
several limitations that would be useful to explore. In
particular, and due to existing findings that anti-fat preju-
dice is linked to increased body dissatisfaction (44), the
current study measured participants’ degree of body
worry in the 4 weeks preceding participation. However,
weight stigma is often also internalized (and perpetuated)
by people who are themselves in the overweight or obese
weight range (1,2). Thus, the possibility that people’s per-
ceptions of what constitutes anti-fat ‘prejudice’ may be
affected by, or correlated with, factors like their own body
mass index cannot be ruled out. Future research should
seek to clarify the current findings by taking body mass
index into consideration when examining the expressions
that people perceive to be ‘prejudice’. Practically speak-
ing, another potential limitation of this study relates to
its core finding that healthcare professionals can play a
key role in reducing stigmatizing misconceptions about
weight. This finding is problematic insofar as existing
research suggests medical doctors and trainees are,
themselves, not unsusceptible to possessing stigmatizing
beliefs about the causes of overweight (e.g. that
people with overweight are lazy; (45)). So, whilst the
present data suggest that healthcare professionals may
be capable of delivering persuasive appeals against
negative weight-based attitudes, many people in
healthcare roles are, in fact, a source of weight-based
stigma (42). Perhaps this highlights a need first to reduce
the anti-fat attitudes held by people in healthcare roles,
before anti-prejudice appeals can persuasively rely on
influence attempts from healthcare professionals.
Fortunately and consistent with the findings here, there
is evidence to suggest that training healthcare students
with an emphasis on the controllable causes of
overweight can lead to decreases in their explicit anti-fat
attitudes (42).
Conclusion
The current study suggests that, with regard to anti-fat at-
titudes, people perceive that describing an attitude as
‘prejudice’ is equivalent to describing it as ‘not true’. Prac-
tically speaking, it is suggested that weight-related anti-
prejudice interventions may be more persuasive if they
are delivered by relevant experts from within the
healthcare setting. Here, a claim about whether negative
weight-based attitudes constituted ‘prejudice’ or ‘truth’
was relatively persuasive if delivered by a medical doctor.
Future research should seek to clarify the persuasive
ability that medical doctors may possess in challenging
stigmatizing societal misconceptions about the controlla-
bility of weight.
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